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For the last half-century, science has been under an immense philosophical scrutin .
Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and many others have gone to great lengths to explain the inner
workings of scientific practice. The focus of their scrutiny has varied from the way science
should work, to the way science does work, with many combinations and comparisons of the
two. Following Popper and Kuhn, philosophers of science have started to understand
"science" as something that is performed by scientists. It is becoming more common for
philosophers to account for the fact that scientists are people, with families, pets, mortgages,
and most importantly, extra-scientific beliefs.
Proponents ofthe more traditional of these views hold that the extra-scientific beliefs
and attitudes can occasionally work themselves into the otherwise immutable and pristine halls
of science. The scientific methods, concepts, and theories become corrupted with subjectivity
from the individuals' beliefs. Some philosophers of science, however, doubt that scientific
methods, concepts, and theories are all that objective, immutable, and pristine to begin with.
Throughout the history of science, they note, the behavior of scientists seems to reveal
something very "un-scientific" about their practice. The plights of the Copernican,
Newtonian, Darwinian, and Einsteinian "revolutions" are not testaments to patient and
objective searches for truth; rather, they are tales of great battles. History crowns the
successful as the enlightened righteous, while the losers, if not forgotten completely, are
deemed ignorant and/or insolent.
It is in the pursuit of success that the role ofthe scientist qlla person is most visible.
Integral to the success of the individual scientist is the success of the tradition, paradigm, or
school ofwhich he or she is a member. When groups of scientists square off on foundational
issues, their discourse often becomes rhetorical, and occasionally personal. As David Hull
points out, the scientific success these groups desire has a methodological price:
Scientists can succeed only if they are willing to break a few methodological
rules-sometimes every rule in the book. However, they cannot finagle al all
costs. Falsifiability does matter in science but not the falsifiability of
disembodied propositions. What really counts is the falsifiability of scientists.
To be successful, a scientist must be able to recognize clear threats to his or
her position and respond appropriately. But the proper response to imminent
refutation is not admitting defeat; it is changing one's position while retaining
one's original terminology. Successful scientists are those who master the art
ofjudicious finagling. I
All of the rhetorical activity in science--the "judicious finagling" Hull speaks of--is usually
quite subtle. When the stakes are high, however, such as when the foundations of a discipline
are being contested, the rhetorical arguments in science become as important as any
arguments based on data.
Thomas Kuhn's theories on "scientific revolutions,,2 explain some of the most heated
and important debates in the history of science, e.g., the Newtonian revolution in mechanics.
Yet, his theory is virtually inapplicable to smaller scale scientific disputes that occur within
relatively stable (non-revolutionary) sub-disciplines. One such field where Kuhn's structure
does not seem to apply is taxonomy. Taxonomists have been embroiled in heated, sometimes
bitter debates for the last fifty years, and have had to work in a field where the conceptual
foundations are in flux more often than not. While the issues may be considered esoteric in
comparison to the issues surrounding Newton's or Einstein's theories, they are the basis for
all taxonomical work and affect any disctpline of biology that relies on zoological
classification. Thus, it is no surprise, according to Michael Ghiselin, that taxonomy is a
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problematic discipline for the philosophy of science:
Taxonomy is a highly controversial subject, and the issues are inextricably
bound up with philosophical disputes which have endured for centuries. The
problems are so important that no biologist can totally avoid facing them.
They are so controversial that objectivity in their study is perhaps an
unattainable goal. And the issues, both biological and philosophical, are often
so recondite that an unequivocal solution seems impossible. 3
In this work I hope to show that the type of explanations given by Popper and Kuhn cannot
adequately account for some of the disputes in taxonomy. The debates are far more
metaphysical than either theory can account for, even though the rhetoric involved is similar
to many well-explained events in the history of science. To give an adequately descriptive
account of these disputes in taxonomy, I will argue that consideration must be given to factors
normally not thought ofas belonging to scientific discourse, and that the best explanation of
these types of disputes, given the nature of the issues, will be in terms of what social and
political theorist W.B. Gallie called "essential contestability."
3
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One of the most overarching problems In biological taxonomy concerns the
classification ofbirds, mammals, and reptiles. Birds have been traditionally placed in the c/as
Aves, the reptiles placed in the class Reptilia, and mammals in the clas Mammalia. These
three equally diverse sets account for most ofour experience with animal life. Yet according
to a different school oftaxonomy, since birds and mammals descended from early "reptilian"
classes (Archosauria and Synapsida, respectively), they are more appropriately placed in
lower ranking classificatory groups: order Aves and order Mammalia. In this chapter,
specific cases will be given to illustrate how this disagreement over the proper ranking of
birds, reptiles, and mammals is representative of fundamental differences between two
schools, namely "Evolutionary" and "Cladistic" taxonomy. These examples will also show
how the disputes between these two schools center around the "Darwinian" tradition. In
order to ground the issues at hand, some of the history of the methods and principles of
taxonomy will be given. If the issues are clear, we should then be able to determine if current
theories on science explain why there are differences not only in the classifications themselves,
but in the way these schools believe that classifications should be made.
A classic example of disagreement in taxonomy is the case ofArchaeopteryx, a fossil
specimen of the late Jurassic period. Archaeopteryx is unique in that it has several reptilian
characters: a long jaw with sharp teeth, skuJl shape and openings typical of dinosaurs of that
period, a long tail, and longer hind limbs than forelimbs, all characters which belong to the
traditional class Reptilia, sub-class Archosauria. Upon examining the specimen, 19th-century
comparative anatomist Richard Owen observed the imprints of feathers on the fossil
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Archaeopteryx. Owen concluded that the feathers must be a key feature of the fossil and
therefore, one ofthe first birds. 4 According to the traditional "Evolutionary" classification,
because of the presence of feathers and regardless of the dominant sub-class Archosauria
traits, Archaeopteryx is an ancestral bird, belonging to the clas Aves. But, according to th
later "Cladistic" school, since Archaeopteryx has the above-mentioned characters of the class
Archosauria, the presence offeathers only serves to place it in the lower ranking taxonomical
order of Aves. For both schools, Archaeopteryx is an ancestral bird in any normal or
colloquial sense ofthe word, but each school ranks it differently.
A much more recent debate in taxonomy is over a much older fossil. Corylurhynchlls,
a mammal-like reptile of the Permian period, was recently displayed as an "early ancestor" in
a mammal exhibit at the American Museum ofNatural History. 5 According to Evolutionary
taxonomists such as Ernst Mayr, Cotylorhynchus is a member of the class Reptilia, sub-class
Synapsida, order Pelycosauria, and, therefore, has no business being shown with mammals.
Mayr wrote in a letter to Science that "Cotylurh.vllchli . has always been classified with that
primitive group of reptiles, the [ital. sic.] Pelycosallria" and further that "even though
Cotylorhynchus is on the [genealogic] branch that ultimately gives rise to the mammals, it is
definitely not a mammal.,,6
In a subsequent issue of Science, Cladistic taxonomist Kevin Padian did not defend
the display ofthe fossil, rather he challenged the validity of Mayr's objection. Padian replied
that "[c]ontrary to what Mayr says, CotylorhYl1chus is not (and never was) a reptile, but a
synapsid [class Synapsida]; it does not belong to the' Pelycosauria,' ... [which] unless rigidly
circumscribed to Dimetrodon [another mammal-like reptile] and a few other forms, is not
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even a monophyletic taxon [a group consisting of a ommon ancestor and all it
descendants]."7 As seen with Archaeopteryx, the problem is not with the specimen but with
how the specimen is categorized. Cladistic taxonomy ranks Aves and Mammalia a orders
instead of classes; Reptilia is not a recognized nomenclature. Thus, Corylorhynchus is
grouped by Cladists in the order Synapsida, distinct from Mammalia.
Both Mayr and Padian ostensibly agree that CotylorhYllchus should not be regarded
as a mammal. They cannot agree, however, that CotylorhYllchus is a reptile, properly
construed. This disagreement serves as evidence for both Mayr and Padian that the other is
grossly confused about the fundamentals of taxonomy. Padian goes on to claim that Mayr
is using Linnaean essentialism to group CotylorhYllchus and misrepresents the grouping by
calling it a "Darwinian" classification, adding that " ...Darwin's name should not be invoked
to endorse a system that [Darwin). regarded as an abhorrent convention.,,8 Mayr responds
that "Padian, by implying that the Linnaean and Darwinian systems are the same, ignores the
history oftaxonomy,,,9 and then, as a polite reminder, proceeds to summarize the history of
taxonomy.
One would think that there must be some substantive dispute here to warrant such an
exchange. At a fundamental level, there is. Evolutionary taxonomists hold that classifications
should be based upon genealogies to determine the relation between specimens and to some
extent the categorical rank, but similarities (or lack of) can override genealogy in
determination of rank. Cladistic taxonomists hold that all matters of classification, relation
and rank, should come from genealogy. In matters of relation between specimens, the two
schools often produce identical results. But in matters of categorical rank, as with
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Cotylorhynchus and Archaeopteryx, there are sharp points of contention. Clearly, the
differences in the categorizations reflect differences in the fundamental principles. What is
not so clear is the nature ofthe arguments for each ofthese sets of principles being the proper
basis of classification.
M.any of the arguments between schools of taxonomy, like the ones above, begin as
arguments over specific classifications, which lead to terminological confusion, and then
eventually to name-calling. to In the Science letters, Mayr's initial letter claimed that
"[e]veryone knows what the manunali.an characters are--hair, warm-bloodedness, nursing the
young with milk, a mammalian jaw .and manunalian teeth, and many other characteristics by
which mammals differ with .ancestral amniotes [the group that contains all vertebrates except
amphibians], usually classified with the reptiles." II Padian complained that most of the
characters Mayr listed as belonging to mammals are not available through the fossil record,
and are useless, if not misleading, in classifying a fossil specimen. Padian probably
overreacted in assuming that Mayr's description constituted the conditions by which mammals
should be classified. Mayr, however, failed to realize that Padian was pointing out his
descriptions as including "essential" characters of a mammal, as Padian claims Linnaeus
would, rather than the "genealogical" characters upon which, Padian claims, Darwin would
insist.
It would be an insult to both taxonomists to suggest that they simply misunderstand
the others' position. Yet, there must be something at stake other than museum displays. 11
is worth noting that even within the informal context of a letter to an editor, Padian and Mayr
seem to exaggerate each other's discrepancies, especially when attempting to conclude who
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is the "Darwinian." This is an especially difficult problem in evolutionary biology as David
Hull explains:
Part of the problem in deciding what actually counts as Darwinian and what
as anti- or non-Darwinian evolution is that scientists are engaged in the
ongoing process of jockeying for recognition in science. Some scientists
exaggerate their differences with the received view to emphasize how original
their contributions are, while others exaggerate the similarities between their
views and those ofcontemporary Darwinians in order to throw the mantle of
the great Darwin around their own shoulders. Their opponents then attempt
to unmask these exaggerations. 12
While established taxonomists such as Mayr probably do not need to "jockey" for scientific
recognition, that he would engage in such behavior says something. It may be that Mayr
values the taxonomic tradition he represents, or it may be that he is engaged in a routine
process ofscientific debate. It may be both, or neither, but it is clear that there is somethillK
going on here over and above a methodological misunderstanding.
The disputes between the Evolutionary and Cladistic taxonomists are not the only
debates where the "mantle of the great Darwin" is contested. Within Cladistic taxonomy
there is a sub-schoolJ.l whose members have totally disassociated their method from
evolutionary biology, and proudly claim to be free of the theoretical constraints of evolution,
or in other words, they are "non-Darwinian." Another dispute in evolutionary biology i the
revitalized argument between Darwin and T.H. Huxley over gradualistic speciation. The
theory of "punctuated equilibrium," as formulated by Stephen Gould and Niles Eldredge,'~
spawned a host of arguments over the necessity of gradual speciation as an essential tenet of
"Darwinian" evolution. Here some of the disputes concern whether accelerated speciation
is "Darwinian," or is an original addition by Gould and Eldredge, or whether Darwin was
initially wrong to suggest gradual evolution.
If set to the task, one can find these disputes throughout evolutionary biolog . In
each case, there is a methodological and/or theoretical debate which at some point, focuse
on the rightful or wrongful inheritance of the Darwinian tradition. If these fight are not
merely a matter of misunderstood methods but are over the authority of the Darwinian
tradition, we should attempt to find what makes the mantle ofDarwin so valuable. To that
effect, Jacques Roger offers this advice:
Darwinism is much more than a scientific theory. This is perhaps one of the
reasons why we still are speaking of Darwinism today. There are no such
things as Maxwellism or Einsteinianism. Only historians speak of
Copernicanism or Newtonianism. But there is Darwinism, in the same way
that there is Freudianism or Marxism. We are therefore obliged to take the
historical phenomenon ofDarwinism in its entirety, without neglecting either
its socio-cultural or its intellectual dimensions. 15
If it is not clear that Darwinism is more than a scientific theory, one need only step out of
science and view it from the standpoint ofa non-scientific opponent.
One noteworthy opponent of Darwinism is theist and anti-naturalist Phillip Johnson.
Johnson brilliantly captures the sentiment of a century's worth of fear and outrage with
Darwin, evolution, and Darwinian science:
In the academic hierarchy, authority to describe "the way things really are"
belongs to natural science, and the history of life belongs to evolutionary
biology. This assignment of authority implies that the question of how living
organisms carne into existence is a matter of specialized knowledge,
knowledge that is not available to persons outside the inner circle of science.
Ordinary people thus have no alternative but to accept what the experts tell
them about such matters, unless they want to be thought ignorant. If the
consensus of opinion among evolutionary biologists is that biological
evolution produced very complex living organisms by purposeless processes
like mutation and selection, then that is an end to the matter. No one has the
authority to say otherwise. l6
Johnson's mission is, of course, to debunk the authority invested in academic science as
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misplaced and irrational, since it does not allow for the possibility of supernatural influence.
Johnson does make a very clear, though sarcastic, point: "ordinary people" place authorit
in Darwinian biology (or, perhaps, Darwinian biologists place authority on themselves) t
explain the way life came to be the way it is. The "mantle of Darwin" from the public's
perspective, is not based solely, perhaps not even primarily, on content, but the establjshmenl
of epistemic authority. However, the public perception of "Darwinian" is not the issue;
rather, it is the scientific community's perception of what it means to be a "Darwinian. '
Instead oftaking Johnson's word for it, the question of"Darwinism" might better be explored
by following Roger's suggestion to carefully consider the intellectual and social history of the
"Darwinian" phenomenon.
Prior to Darwin's Origin of Species,17 biological classifications were mostly
ahistorical. The 18th-century botanist Carl Linnaeusl8 developed a classification system in
which organisms were placed into groups by virtue of their "essential" characters. Generally
considered to be the founder of modem taxonomy, Linnaeus cataloged and classified the flora
and fauna known at the time into a "natural system" of categories. His justitication of this
system was that each species is immutable by virtue of its creation by God, and thus reflects
a divine and necessarily unchanging type. This view was based on the Platonic!Aristotelian
notion ofan "essence. !I My dog, for instance, has a tail, two eyes, four legs, hair, paws, and
makes the sound "ruff-ruff" These are characteristics that all "dogs" have and are "essential"
to being a dog. That is, those characteristics are the unchanging attributes of the form, idea,
or eidos of"dog." The main task of pre-Darwinian taxonomists was to discover the various
characters of the forms of species on which classifications could be based.
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In the Origin ofSpecies, however, Charles Darwin joined others in insistin that the
names of organisms are merely proper names, and have no defining properties out id of
being labels. Furthermore, Darwin claimed that the "natural system' Linnaeus had been trying
to discover was in fact a system based on the "propinquity of descent.' In Chapter 13 of the
Origin, Darwin claimed that in many cases the classifications Linnaeus and others had been
making turn out to reveal this principle ofdescent. It only followed, Darwin thought, that the
principles by which we should continue taxonomic work should be based on descent
(genealogy):
All the foregoing rules and aids and difficulties in classification are explained,
if I do not greatly deceive myself, on the view that the natural system is
founded on descent with modification; that the characters which naturalists
consider as showing true affinity between any two or more species, are those
which have been inherited from a common parent, and in so far, all true
classification is genealogical; that community ofdescent is the hidden bond
which naturalists have been unconsciously seeking, and not some unknowfl
plan of creation, or the enunciation of general propositions, and mere
pUlling together and separating objects more or less alike. 19
Darwin here has made it clear that the natural system of classification is genealogical, and not
one in which a plan of creation is revealed, nor one based on general grouping guidelines
concerning (physical or functional) resemblance such as the above-described "essential"
characters. Darwin's point is that even though Linnaeus and others had been classifying
specimens under the pre-supposition of a divine plan containing the form-types of life, the
groups under which these specimens are placed will invariably reveal descent. Consider,
again., my dog: She has four legs, a tail, hair, and paws. Even these most basic descriptions
considerably narrow what type of thing we are talking about, a rodent, bear, feline, or canine
Here Darwin would claim that we have aocidentally described a group with common ancestry.
II
That is, the reason the similarities exist is the common ancestry of rodents bars, feline and
canines. The more specific our descriptions become the more recent the common ancestor ,
and the smaller the group. Thus the "natural system" seems to converge on the principle of
descent. But, as he elaborates:
... I must explain my meaning mOlie fully. I believe that the arrangement of
the groups within each class, in due subordination and relation to the other
groups, must be strictly genealogical in order to be natural; but that the
amount of difference in the several branches or groups, though allied in the
same degree in blood to their common progenitor, may differ greatly, being
due to the different degrees of modification which they have undergone; and
this is expressed by the forms being ranked under different genera, families,
sections, or orders. 20
This famous passage reflects a very critical distinction between the arrangemellf of groups
and the amount ofdifference as expressed in the ranking ofgroups. The arrangemellT of
groups, as Darwin sees it, is based on common descent. That is. the relation between wolves,
coyotes, hyenas, and domestic dogs within the family Canidae is arranged according to the
line of descent of each of these. However, the ranking of groups into categories, such as
class,family, and order, has to be measured by similarities or resemblance, as they have come
about through differing degrees of modification by natural selection. This is ba ically the
claim ofEvolutionary taxonomists with respect to specimens like the Archaeopferyx, where
there seems to exist a feature so divergent as to overrule descent, viz, feathers.
Darwin's views on taxonomy went virtually unnoticed until the mid 20th century.
Originated by 1. H. Huxley, G. G. Simpson, and Ernst Mayr. the "new systematics"2J
movement in biology sought to embrace Darwin's ideas on taxonomy and make it part of the
"modern Darwinian synthesis." Taxonomy up to that point had been more or I.ess a
continuation of the principles advanced by Linnaeus and the methods developed by the
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19th-century naturalist Georges Cuvier. 21 But the "new sy tematics' movement
"rediscovered" Darwin and began to develop his theory of genealogical, or phylogenetic
taxonomy into a method. Holding true to Darwin's views, the "new systematics" school
insisted that the arrangement of taxa (specimens) needed to be organized according to
descent, while the Linnaean ranking continued to be subject to character similarity.
Though the new systematists (proponents of what would later be called Evolutionary
taxonomy) often had to defend their view against the attacks of taxonomists holding strictly
character-based, or phenetic approaches, they were the only significant proponents of
phylogenetic (genealogical) taxonomy for many years. In 1950 (translated in 1966), the
Gennan systematist Willi Hennig23 published a paper which claimed that a viable taxonomic
system could be constructed that considered only the arrangement of taxa according to
descent. He named this type of taxonomy "phylogenetic systematics" (which would later
become Cladistic taxonomy). Hennig claimed that categorical organization did not require
any special apparatus, but could be determined by genealogical relationships, properly
construed.
The Cladistic method suggests that in comparing taxa, we can deduce which two of
any three have the more recent common ancestor by finding which two share the greatest
number ofderived (through descent) characters. A simple case would be to compare my dog,
an Iguana, and a Parakeet. The Cladist would point out that the Parakeet and the Iguana have
more shared derived characters than either do with my dog. For instance, even though the
bird has feathers, both the Iguana and the Parakeet have scaly, taloned feet which the dog
does not. Since all three have bones, being a vertebrate is considered to be an ancestral
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characteristic. In faet, any character my dog shares with a lizard, she will also share with the
bird. Clearly, the Cladistic method teUs us, the Iguana and Parakeet have a more recent
common ancestor. We can infer, therefore, that a speciation event or branching occurred
between the ancestors of my dog and the ancestors of the Iguana and Parakeet before th re
was a branching between the ancestors of the Iguana and the ancestors of the Parakeet.
To perform a strictly descent-based classification, Hennig used these sub-divided
branches (or clades) as representative of a new categorical ranking. In our example, the
ancestor of my dog and the common ancestor of the Iguana and the Parakeet would
constitute one categorical ranking. Likewise, the branching between the ancestors of the
Iguana and the Parakeet would mark a lower categorical ranking. While fine for large
classes, to adequately explain the differenc·e between the multitudes ofliving things Hennig's
system required an extremely high number of categories and a total revision of the existing
classifications. Subsequently, Hennig's system was quick to receive criticism for it's
seemingly unnecessary complexity and branching-based categorizations. But it was quick to
gain a large following due to its simple and consistent method; this following remains large
enough to make it the prevailing method for determining taxonomic arrangements.
We can now see the beginnings of the contemporary debates. Contemporary Cladists,
taking Hennig's position to its conclusion, claim that Evolutionary taxonomists employ
"intuition" when concluding that a dissimilarity is significant enough to warrant a change in
rank. Cladists claim that the Evolutionary taxonomist intuitively determines that the presence
(or absence) ofcertain characters are more important than other characters, such as feathers
on the Archaeopteryx. According to the "weighted" characters, a phenetic (physical
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similarity) ranking can be given instead ofaph Jogen ti (genealogical) one. It is claimed
by Cladists that because these classificatory groups are defined by relationships that can be
phenetic or phylogenetic, it is difficult to evaluate any evolutionary significance in the
groupings. Therefore, in the sense that this taxonomical system can lack evolutionary
significance (i.e., ignore descent), it is less Darwinian than the Cladistic approach (if
Darwinian at all).
The main Cladistic criticism ofthe Evolutionary taxonomical system is that in allowing
phenetic data to be a deciding factor in the hierarchical placement of taxa, Evolutionary
taxonomists allow for the existence ofparaphyletic groups. A paraphyletic group is one
which contains a common ancestor and most of its descendants, but not all. An example of
this would be a family tree that starts with a grandfather and grandmother and contains all
their children and their offspring, except for one of the children who is "disowned" because
oftheir being born with six fingers and three eyes. The divergence is so great that the child
is no longer considered to be a member of the family. In a zoological example. disowned
children born of reptilian parents are the birds. While reptilian in many respects. birds have
feathers and thus make for unsightly reptiles. The harshest criticism by the Cladists comes
when the birds (or the six-fingered, three-eyed offspring) are elevated to the hierarchical level
ofthe parents (i.e., to that of a class) To the Cladist, this seems unnatural, and out of place
in a "truly evolutionary" or "Darwinian" system of taxonomy.
The type ofgroup demanded by the Cladists is a monophyletic group, which contains
the common ancestor and all of its descendants. Monophyl.etic groups, as might be guessed,
are a consequence ofrestrieting classifications to phylogenetic inference If genealogy is the
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only consideration in establishing the hierarchy ofgroups within groups, then necessaril all
groups will be subordinated by their lineage. This is why the Aves are ranked by Evolutionary
taxonomists as a class, and by the Cladistic taxonomists as an order, subordinated by th
class Archosauria from which they evolved. This may also be the basis of Padian ' s complaint
that Mayr's grouping does not constitute a "monophyletic taxon." This is a critique that only
other Cladists would see as necessarily damaging, since they insist on monophyletic groups,
and Evolutionary taxonomists do not.
In their insistence on monophyletic groups and in pointing out what they claim to be
a methodological weakness, Cladists directly challenge the principles of taxonomy upheld by
Evolutionary taxonomists. While Mayr and other Evolutionary taxonomists can appeal
directly to the Origin as the source of their truly "Darwinian" principles, Cladists point out
that Darwin was mistaken on several points in the Origin (for instance, perhaps, gradual
evolution) and his views on taxonomy should be included as those that are misguided. The
Cladists, in this sense, are appealing to the "intent" or "spirit" of evolutionary theory instead
of the "letter" of Darwin's law. Both schools nonetheless insist that they are the true
"Darwinians."
Some contemporary Cladists are moving in a direction as to make the gap between
the "spirit" and "letter" of evolutionary theory even greater. Taxonomists like Kevin de
Queiroz and Jacques Gauthie~ have attacked Linnaean nomenclature as totally incompatible
with evolutionary theory. Linnaean categories, they claim, are based on the statement of
necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in a particular taxa. This requirement
implies that we define what it means to be a member of a particular taxon (true Linnaean
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essentialism), instead of discovering genealogies and naming what we find in the "natural"
phylogenetic system. A consequence of the abandonment of Linnaean nomenclature and
categories is that Darwin's (and the Evolutionary taxonomists') ranking according to de ree
ofsimilarity becomes irrelevant and unnecessary. Instead, these "post-Cladists" espouse that
nomenclature oftaxa can be read directly from their genealogy. To complete the evolutionary
taxonomic theory and finish the work begun by Darwin, Mayr, and Hennig, post-Cladists
claim that the Linnaean architecture must be abandoned in favor of a truly "Darwinian'
system of nomenclature and arrangement, and only then will the "Darwinian" revolution in
taxonomy begin.
One problem m determining which classifications and which assignments of
"Darwinian" are correct, at least between Mayr and Padian in the Science letters, seems to
be the mixing of colloquial language with technical taxonomic terminology. Everyday
language need not be taxonomically specific, and so in general, probably reflects only the
basic linguistic classifications commonly made with respect to life as it is today, rather than
life as it has been throughout history. Just as Aves, Mammalia, and Reptilia are vaguely
referred to as "birds," "mammals," and "reptiles," and just as COlylorhyllchlls is vaguely
referred to as a "mammal-like reptile," there seems to be no way to talk about taxonomy
without including at least some colloquial language. The difficulty with this is that colloquial
language usually consists of "essential" descriptions rather than "genealogical" descriptions,
as Padian suggested of Mayr. For Mayr, however, it is a set of characters that define
"mammal." That is, by definition, a mammal is the kind of thing that has hair, is
warm-blooded, and nurses its young with milk. Mayr would claim that it is by definition, not
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essence, that these characters describe a mammal. Padian s inaccurate claim that Mayr i
using "Linnaean" methods does, however, associate Mayr with an "essentialist" view. For
Mayr, this confusion is an unfortunate consequence of language, but for Padian, it is evidence
of a "non-Darwinian" view of taxonomy.
Given this linguistic barrier, is it possible that the quibble over CotylorhYl/chus and
the historical debate over Archaeopteryx can be resolved? A traditional, Popperian view of
science would answer that the debate between Mayr and Padian (and by eX1ension, Cladistic
and Evolutionary taxonomy), when stripped of its colloquial language and conceptual
misunderstandings, should ultimately be resolvable by a rational argument based on some kind
of evidence or tests.
A Kuhnian view of science, on the otber hand, would claim that these disagreements
reveal significant theoretical differences between the two schools. Proponents of this view
would explain that what is thought to be common to the schools, namely terms and
observations, do not have common meanings since they are dependent upon different
theoretical foundations, and therefore can not serve as a basis for rational argument
Subsequently, the apparent inability of these schools to corne to agreement on basic is ues is
to be expected---the two views of taxonomy are incommensurable on these points.
While each ofthese views can be supported in greater or lesser degrees by historical
examples, it is not clear that both are addressing the same kinds of issues. Clearly, neither of
these positions seems to adequately account for the rhetorical dispute in the Science letters
or the conceptual disputes over fundamental principles from which quibbles like the Science
letters arise. But in having established some of the history and methods of two opposed
schools of taxonomy, we have seen by an inspection of the debates surrounding
Cotylorhynchus and Archaeopteryx that there is something disputed in addition to
fundamental principles, namely, the status ofbeing "Darwinian.' In the next chapter we shall
see how neither scientific view introduced works for all scientific disputes, even though each
might provide good explanations for many events. Specifically, we shall see that with respect
to the problems in taxonomy, neither view is sufficient to demarcate the "true Darwinians
nor is capable of solving the classificatory problems with birds, mammals, and reptiles.
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II
Ifone were to ask a group of scientists which view of science they hold, the might
respond by saying something about "the only one." That is, there is a fairly strict and static
"standard" view of science which most scientists (and many philosophers of science) shar .
This "standard" view is not, however, the only way of describing how science works. Some
believe that science is quite dynamic, and that the methods of science are often reflections of
the people applying them. In this chapter, we shall examine both of these views with the aim
of determining if either can account for the disputes encountered in taxonomy.
The standard-view ofscience usually refers to a method afjustification. Karl Popper
is generally held to be the authoritative voice of the standard view in its most sophisticated
and pristine form. Popper is most known for his view that scientific theories must not be
judged in terms of their verifiability, rather they must continually be put to the test. and be
judged in terms of their falsifiability. That is, any proposition or theory that does not lend
itselfto a possible test, and thus a possible falsification, cannot be considered scientific. The
emphasis of the Popperian or "standard" view is, subsequently, on the testing and testability
of scientific claims. But as Popper points out, the simple "test" of an hypothesis is an
insufficient basis for science. There are several aspects of "testing" which require
consideration:
We may ifwe like distinguish four different lines along which the testing of a
theory could be carried out. First there is the logical comparison of the
conclusions among themselves, by which the internal consistency of the
system is tested. Secondly, there is the investigation of the logical form of the
theory, with the object of determining whether it has the character of an
empirical or scientific theory, or whether it is, for example, tautological
Thirdly, there is the comparison with other theories, chiefly with the aim of
detennining whether the theory would constitute a scientific advance should
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it survive our various tests. And finally, there is the testing of the theory by
way of empirical applications of the conclusions which can be derived from
it. 2S
The "Newtonian" theory of mechanics provides a good illustration of the various factors
involved in testing. One ofthe most significant contributions by Newton was his development
of a calculus in which we could make predictions given certain physical circumstances. His
logico-mathematical system ofdifferential calculus, which is still in use. is internally consistent
and provides coherent solutions to "real-world" problems. For example, given the speed and
weight of one billiard ball, and given the weight of a second motionless billiard ball in the
other's path, we can use Newton's calculus to determine the speed of both balls when the first
strikes the second, even though to detennine this we may rely on the merely "logical" relation
of "force."
Newton's theory seems to meet Popper's criteria on all four points. We can make
predictions using Newton's theory and compare the conclusions to establish its internal
consistency. Secondly, we can establish Newton's theory as a scientific theory given it
dependence on a calculus. To know whether Newtonian mechanics provides a "scientific
advance," we need only notice that the trajectory of cannonballs became significantly more
precise using the calculus (where it had hitherto been mostly a matter of trial and error)
Finally, two-hundred years of direct tests of hypotheses based on Newton's theories have
failed to produce any significant falsifying evidence, and thus earned some of Newton's
claims the monikers of "laws."
With some disciplines, however, direct tests of some hypotheses are impossible: In
the first fossil reconstruction of BrOJllOSaUrIIs,26 O. C. Marsh of the Carnegie Museum in
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Pittsburgh had no way to know whether he was reassembling the keleton correctly. The onl
bases he had for reconstructing the fossil were his theoretical expectations and understanding
of reptilian physiology. No test could detenmne whether or not he was accuratel
representing the mammoth dinosaur, since aU he had was theory and the headless fossil
remains. The problem for Marsh and for contemporary paleontologists is that there is no
way to test their theories against fact. At best, a paleontologist can test his or her theories
against the closest living facts available. Subsequently, the infonnation paleontologists extract
from fossilized bones depends on which living analogies (i.e., the various life-forms with
which we have experience) paleontologists draw their theories from.
According to the Popperian view, the scientific method allows us to build
comprehensive theories from individually tested hypotheses. In order to make sense of a
number of disjointed testable statements, we must construct logical or theoretical relations
between the testable components of theory using non-testable propositions. Propositions
such as these, which are difficult or impossible to test, must rely on related. testabl
hypotheses as grounds for their acceptance. In the case ofBrontosaurus. Marsh worked from
a comprehensive theoretical model of what Bronlosaurus-sized dinosaurs should look like.
and assembled the skeleton accordingly. If a comprehensive theory like the one the Marsh
used to reconstruct his fossil has a high degree of confidence through confirmations (non-
falsifications) of other constituent hypotheses from physiology, geology, etc., the overall
theory is usually considered to be solid, even though some of the hypotheses may be difficult
to test.
Some philosophers ofscience consider this description ofscience to be over-simpl istic
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on several counts. These philosophers note that ifparts of a comprehensive theory are tested
and falsified, the propositions are modified according to related but not necessarily confirmed
(testable), hypotheses. Furthennore, the credibility that untestable hypotheses gain in their
relation to testable hypotheses is not due to the testability, but to the theory that relates the
hypotheses; and this relation is not always clearly a "logical" one as in the case of Newton'
calculus. To wit, they believe that the modifications, scientists make to their falsified theories
are bounded by the specific "scientific enterprise" through which they are discovered or
derived. That is, there exist boundaries within which a scientist frames acceptable problems
and solutions, and it is within these boundaries that a scientist modifies a f;:lIsified theory or
conditionally accepts an otherwise untenable proposition.
Even the most significant falsified hypotheses are modified within the boundaries of
the specific theory around which they are fonnulated. For example, the failure of the
Michelson-Morley experimene7 marks a major shift in the history of physics, yet this shift was
far from quick or decisive. A. A. Michelson and E. W. Morley designed an experiment to
illustrate the static Newtonian nature of Earth's orbit, and to indirectly confirm the existence
of an ethereal medium through which the Earth and light moved. When the experiment
produced a negative result, the Newtonian theory was not abandoned or questioned, but the
experiment and the conclusions it should have produced were, Several decades later, even
years after Albert Einstein had proposed a relativistic view of the universe (which accounts
for the Michelson-Morley results), some physicists still held and argued for a static view of
the universe which the Michelson-Morley experiment ostensibly falsified. 28
An alternative to the Poppenan view of science holds that "scientific enterprises," like
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Newtonian mechanics, go on within a conceptual framework. The guidelines set b this
framework detennine which problems and solutions are acceptable, and what terms ar
acceptable for expressing these problems and solutions.
Thomas Kuhn's version oftbis philosophy of science holds that scientists of the same
paradigm, or conceptual framework, operate within a shared scientific world-view. The
normal course of science is to refine the problems and solutions presented by this world-view,
and to train new scientists in that tradition. There often comes a point, however. where the
traditional solutions and language do not or cannot address certain problems found by later
generations. When this occurs, Kuhn claims that the later generations begin to rethink their
world-view so that they may solve the new set of problems, forming a new paradigm. These
old and new paradigms compete for dominance within the scientific community: the new
paradigm trying to become the new "standard" world-view, the old paradigm trying to
maintain the tradition.
According to Kuhn, the competition between paradigms must take place within one
of the traditions: ". .. there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system oflanguage
or concepts... the proposed construction of alternate tests and theories must proceed from
within one or another paradigm tradition.,,29 In the Michelson-Morley experiment, for
example, the experiment was designed and performed within the Newtonian paradigm, and
the experiment's failure in the Newtonian paradigm is generally supposed to support
Einstein's view. Even though the experiment is performed and understood under the
conceptual language of Newton, where mass, space, and time are static. it can only be said
to support Einstein when understood in the language of Einstein, where mass, space, and time
24
are dynamic. The experiment cannot be conunensurated between both paradigms since each
view is theoretically opposed to the other on the very points of contention. or could it be
understood "objectively," i.e., between neither paradigm, since a third view would require et
another competitive understanding of mass, space, and time. Because of these differences in
world-views, it is claimed, the competing scientists will not be able to formulate their
arguments in a language the opposing paradigm will understand and/or accept. The
paradigms, and the arguments coming from them, are incommensurable.
But what of the Brontosaurus? Kuhn's view of science gives us the explanatory
devices to describe what goes on in science when paleontologists argue over the bird-like or
reptile-like nature of this or that dinosaur: they are working from different paradigms. Yet
Kuhn would have a difficult time explaining the rest of the Brontosaurus story.
Even though the 1870's discovery of Brontosaurus was missing a cranium, the
museum reconstruction was complete, head and all. The problem with the museum head was
that it wasn't a Brontosaurus head. On failing to find a head in the original matrix, Marsh's
team looked around the site to see ifit was nearby. Several miles later they found one, with
the bones ofa Camarasaurus. Thus the Brontosaurus displayed at the Carnegie Museum had
a Camarasaurus head.
Marsh's theories told him that the Camarasaurtls head found miles away must be, or
would at least work for, the roughly similar Brontosaurus. And it did, for nearly one hundred
years. Some keen investigative work by John McIntosh and David Berman3u found that
Marsh's Brontosaurus not only had the wrong head, but that a few years later another
Brontosaurus specimen had been unearthed, with head, and suppressed since 1915 in favor
2S
of Marsh's "guess."
The correction made to Brontosauros did not significant! alter anyone's view on th
creature, or views on dinosaurs in general. Some classificatory revisions were made. and a
few changes in the arrangement of the Infraorder Sauropoda. While the revi ions do not
bring any great scientific advance, they do raise some serious questions about our iew of
science. Paleontological reconstruction relies on theory derived from physiology, geology,
living analogies, and many other sources, yet even with those things considered. all we reall
have are the fossils. We have no clear way of confinning or denying most of our hypotheses
about what the bones represent. Kuhn's view tells us that our view of the bones is
inextricably linked to the way we view the rest of the natural world. The "bird" people and
the "reptile" people lack certain common elements to their views of the natural and historical
world, and will find it difficult, if not impossible, to communicate on select issues. But the
case of the Brontosaurus does not fall under this or Popper's views. Here we have a case
where a dubious assumption is made and held in the face of contradictory evidence that
opposing parties clearly understand. What does this tell us about this type of "science"? The
subject ofthe "head" dispute is scientific, the people presenting the arguments are scientists,
so what do we call the justification for the suppression of contradictory evidence?
The blame for the "suppression of evidence" belongs not to Marsh, but more likely
to Henry Osborn. Osborn, like Marsh, was a very influential paleontologist during the early
20th century, and had a habit of throwing his influential weight around. Osborn had been
studying Marsh's Brontosaurus and developing his own theories about its physiology and
lifestyle. After the discovery of the complete skeleton, Osborn "dared" the Carnegie Museum
26
director to put up the new, headed version of the Brontosaurus. 31 Needless to sa , the
specimen remained headless until the next museum director refitted the second Bromo aurus
with a Camarasauros skull, just like Marsh's original.
While Popper seems to be on track about the nature of scientific evidence, and its
falsifiability, and Kuhn seems to have a point in saying that members of different paradigms
might view the same evidence differently, both assume that scientific evidence will invariably
make it to the table so that it can be falsified or viewed differently in the first place. The case
concerning the proper head of the Brontosaurus illustrates that scielltific authority has
something to do with the admission or suppression ofevidence. In so much as this is true,
authority over science and scientists can overrule any evidence from any paradigm simply by
not letting potential evidence become recognized evidence.
As both Popper and Kuhn point out, however, science is not merely a process of
collecting artifacts or data, hypothesizing, and testing. Science is also a process of theorizing
relations between testable claims. Taxonomy is in fact the science of determining the relation
between the natural artifacts of life on Earth. There is no evidence per se to be suppressed
by authority that could affect how one detennines the relation between specimens, but one
could certainly manipulate the methods and principles by which the relations are made. With
physical evidence, one must hide or destroy the would-be evidence, disallowing the possibility
of witnesses or someone finding the hidden truth (bringing a new meaning to "skeleton in the
closet"). Methods and principles are not something that can be suppressed easily, as it is
difficult to hide something that is mostly conceptual. The manipulation of methods and
principles, however, is not at all difficult to envision.
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In the preceding chapter, a distinction was made between Evolutionary and Cladistic
taxonomy by pointing out that the former allowed paraph letic groups (a group that contains
an ancestor and most if not all of its descendants) and the latter allowed only mOlJoph Jetic
groups (a group that contains an ancestor and all of its descendants). This is an accurate
description, as long as you are a Cladist. For the Evolutionary taxonomist, monoph letic has
always meant what Cladists mean when they say paraphyletic. When Willi Hennig published
the theory that would become Cladistic taxonomy, he appropriated the term monophyletic
from the not-quite-yet unified school ofEvolutionary taxonomy. Since then, Evolutionary
taxonomists have returned the favor by renaming what Cladists call a monophyletic group a
holophy/etic group. The result from this exchange of tenninology is usually chaos. All
taxonomists know what is meant when «paraphyletic" or «holophyletic" is used, but the
meaning of"monophyletic" can only be known when the beliefs of the speaker or writer are
known (i.e., whether he or she subscribes to the views of Cladistic or Evolutionary
taxonomy). Given this added dimension to the taxonomy debates, the words of David Hull
start to ring (again):
...Falsifiability does matter in science but not the falsifiability of disembodied
propositions. What really counts is the falsifiability of scientists. To be
successful, a scientist must be able to recognize clear threats to his or her
position and respond appropriately. But the proper response to imminent
refutation is not admitting defeat; it is changing one's position while retaining
one's original terminolo!,y Successful scientists are those who master the art
ofjudicious finagling. 32
No Evolutionary taxonomist believes Willi Hennig to be the anti-Christ of taxonomy. Hennig
is regarded by all as one of the important contributors to taxonomy. Hennig's views were not
realized amy by some extreme Cladistic "movement," Evolutionary taxonomists use Cladistic
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methods as well, but not just Cladistic methods. Mayr and others retained their terminolo
and altered their positions to take advantage of the new Cladistic methods, but maintained the
original principles they share with Darwin, viz., that excessive divergence in descent had to
be accounted for in the taxonomical scheme.
While some "judicious finagling" is evident in the recent history of taxonomy, that
there is a battle over methods and principles based on authority is not quite clear. As we have
seen, taxonomists are dealing with issues of categorization. "Testing" to see whether
Cotylorhynchus is a "reptile" may work, provided a testable criterion of"reptile" exists. But
"testing" to see if the categorical definition of "reptile" is correct does not seem plausible.
That is, the "correctness" of a category does not seem to be the kind of thing that can be
resolved by tests. We have also seen that the different groupings are a result of the different
fundamental principles on which each school bases its classifications, concepts such as
paraphyletic and monophyletic. But it tS clear that the two sides can communicate,
understand the different positions, and have formed arguments (terminological confusion
notwithstanding). It cannot be entirely correct to say that the two schools are
incommensurable.
One of the keys to these debates is the metaphysical nature of classifIcation, namely,
the classification of evolving things. Colloquial language promotes the use of essential
descriptions ofobjects. Something is a chair if it has legs, a seat, can be sat upon, etc. These
types ofdescriptions become problematic, however, if the subject tends to change over time.
For instance, at what point in the last two-hundred million years was it that species developed
enough hair, or sufficiently complex mammary glands, or a specific type of teeth (whatever
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the characters may be) to qualify as mammals? While criteria can be set and specim ns may
be "tested" against this criteria., the selection ofthe criteria is purely arbitrary. As Darwin
argued, and as far as all the involved taxonomists are concerned, there exists no "form' b
which we can correctly or incorrectly establish criteria for membership in any zoological class.
The categorization of living things is an arbitrary construction and has no lie 'es aty
connection to the living things themselves, other than the accidental revelation of descent.
Ifthe criteria for categorical membership is in fact arbitrary, then we might ask whose
charge it is to establish such criteria. As we have seen from the Science letters, this is
precisely what is in dispute. The question of Cotylorhynchus is not a question of whether it
is a "reptile" or not, but whether the Cladistic description of Cotylorhynchus as a member of
the class Synapsida or the Evolutionary taxonomist's description of it as a member of the
class Reptilia is the better, more natural, or, simply put, more "Darwinian" description.
lfit is those who wear the "mantle ofDarwin" that have the authority to establish the
basis for classifications, then, again, we might ask who are in fact the "Darwinians" in
taxonomy? Is it the Evolutionary taxonomists who hold a position very similar to Darwin's?
Or is it the Cladists who are, perhaps, more in line with contemporary ("Darwinian")
evolutionary theory in their approach?
The identity of"the Darwinians" is a perplexing issue which has received a fair amount
ofattention on its own.33 The problem with determining who is "Darwinian" is the same type
ofproblem encountered with mammals. How does one form the criteria for membership in
something that is constantly changing? If one bases the criteria on essential theoretical tenets
or principles, then the number of"Darwinians" is likely to be quite low (if any more than one)
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Furthennore, whatever tenets that may have counted as essential to "Darwinism' in Darwin' s
day most likeLy will not be considered essential to contemporary "Darwinism. ,. If social
groups are used to demarcate "Darwinians," then, again, many otherwise full-fledged
supporters will not meet the criteria by virtue of their geographic separation.
It seems as though we are left with the same type of problem encountered with
establishing the criteria ofzoological categories. As with classification, there seems to be a
core concept around which a 110tioll of"Darwinian" exists. With classification, the principle
ofdescent provided this notion. It may be the case for' Darwinian" as well.3~ But there are
significant differences in the two concepts which makes "Darwinian" not nearly as arbitrary
as the criteria for "Reptilia." As seen with the Science letters, it seems to matter a great deal
who turns out to be the "Darwinian." Those who are "Darwinian," as suggested above, have
the ostensible authority to establish the foundations of their discipline. Thus in the assignment
of "Darwinian," there seems to be an appraisive component. In other words, it means
something good (whether for one's posterity or for one's career) to be called a "Darwinian."
What is needed is a view of science which will allow us to deal with these "scientific"
disputes. We have looked at two of the dominant views of science in Popper and Kuhn, and
found that both views completely overlook scenarios where the appeal to scientific al/thorit)'
is used. Furthennore, the debates in taxonomy seem to hinge, at least in part, on the authority
of the Darwinian tradition. Clearly, we have left the realm of falsifiability and deductive
methods. There is no reason to think, however, that debates over the inheritance of the
Darwinian tradition are not, at the very least, pre-scientific in nature. After all, those who end
up being "Darwinians" will be the ones writing the textbooks and refereeing the important
31
journals--essentially controlling what is and is not acceptable science, and setting the
foundations for what Kuhn calls "normal science."
Ifwe try to explain this using current views of science, we will find that the problems
with the classification of birds, mammals, and reptiles can be explained by virtu of the
fi.mdamentaJ principles on which they are based. However, these fundamental principles only
become fundamental through their acceptance by the "Darwinians." The fundamental
principles by which the ownership of the Darwinian tradition is determined are not so easily
traced. These detenninations are moved by rhetoric and social and political impulses within
the scientific community, and should be treated as such.
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Ifa scientific dispute boils down to the assignment ofa vague appraisive concept such
as "Darwinian," then as far as most philosophers of science are concerned, all bets are off.
For the Popperians, we have gone beyond the domain of scientific inquiry, yet for Kuhnians.
this is still a crucial and problematic debate. In either case, no scientific e planatory
framework exists that could give an account ofthis activity. There is a possible explanation,
but it requires that we resign the objective nature of science in favor of the subjective world
ofsociaJ and political philosophy. In this final chapter, I will present the theory of "essential
contestability" in hopes of explaining the problems associated with the identification of
"Darwinians." If the problem is sufficiently identified, then perhaps some light will be shed
on the actual taxonomic cases such as CotyJorhY/lchus and Archaeopteryx.
The most significant evidence for the importance ofwho or what is "Darwinian" is the
actions of the ostensible "Darwinians." The letters in Science show how this seemingly
scientifically unimportant label can be a large point of contention. Several of the most
influential authors in evolutionary biology, including Gould, Ruse, Dawkins, and Lewontill,
have tried to determine the precise nature of "Darwinism," but have agreed on very littleH
Most agree that there is some set of criteria that "Darwinians" meet and "non-Darwinians"
don't, but there is no consensus on what these criteria should be. In practice it seems that to
say someone or some work is "Darwinian" is to say that this person or work is within the
parameters of the accepted practice of biological science. Likewise, to claim that someone
or some work is not "Darwinian," seems to say that this person or work is not within the
bounds of acceptable biological scientific practice and should, therefore, be regarded lightly.
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It is clear why this could be an important point for taxonomists, but it is not so clear
why the application is problematic. David Hull offers this diagnosis:
As I see it, the problem these evolutionary biologists are having with
"Darwinism" is that they have failed to extend to conceptual systems the same
sort ofperspective they apply to species. They do not expect species to have
an essence--a set of traits that all and only members of a particular species
have throughout all time; but they do expect conceptual systems to have all
essence--a set of tenets that all and only instances of a particular conceptual
system have throughout all time. 36
Hull suggests a way ofunderstanding conceptual systems which requires that we see them as
historical entities that evolve over time, without essences, per se. However, we are not
necessarily interested in understanding conceptual systems for what they are. Rather our
focus is on giving an explanation of the actions taken by "Darwinians" on the basis of their
own understanding of their conceptual system, be it confused or not. Furthermore, we wish
to explain how "Darwinians" can think of themselves or others as correct or misguided in the
application of that name. As Hull points out, this is usually in terms of an essentialist
description of "Darwinian" as a conceptual system,
While Hull's advice that we view conceptual systems as historical entities may give
a better explanation ofwho are the "Darwinians," it seems clear that this view is not the one
genera1Jy used by the debate participants. Can taxonomists such as Mayr and Padian reach
an agreement as to the proper application of"Darwinian"? Can there be agreement as to the
"essential" characteristics of"Darwinian" taxonomy? Or is this dispute one that is rationally
irresolvable?
In academic debate, there has long been the belief that rational arguments about the
nature of concepts like "justice," "liberty," and "freedom" can not only persuade opponents,
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but settle these issues once and for all. But, since 1956 when W.B. Gallie37 first presented
his paper "Essentially Contested Concepts," there has been a growing number of political and
social theorists who claim this belief is unwarranted. Debates over concepts like' justice,'-
"liberty," and "freedom," they noticed, do not get settled, and rarely is anyone convinced even
by the strongest of arguments. These theorists began to follow Gallie in suggesting that th
reason why there never seems to be an end to these disputes is found not in the nature of the
arguments, but in the nature of the disputed concepts.
Gallie suggests that certain concepts are "essentially contested." His claim, in effect.
is that disagreements over the true meaning of a certain type of concept are irresolvable by
rational argument. These concepts are essentially contestable because they have (a) a
normative impact (they are appraisive), (b) several factors which constitute the concept
(internal complexity), (c) several possible definitions in which these factors are selected and
ordered (initially variously describable), (d) the possibility of modification without changing
the goal of resolution (they are open), and (e) proponents who realize that others preter
alternative definitions, but still defend their own as the only correct interpretation (used
aggressively and defensively). Because of these attributes, the possibility of a single definition
satisfying the demands of all applicable rational arguments is precluded.
"Justice," for example, has been an essentially contested concept throughout the
history of philosophy. 38 In Plato's Republic, we find Socrates soliciting three definitions of
justice: "Telling the truth and returning what you receive," "giving each their due," and "the
advantage of the stronger." Socrates argues that none of these views are sufficient in their
own right, but when placed in the context of a republic, in terms of obedience, honor, and
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property, they become jointly sufficient. It would seem, however, that Socrates as not
entirely convincing. We can still find these individual view of justice in modem ethical
theories: In the duty-based ethics of Kant (teUing the truth and returning what you recei e).
in the libertarian-based ethics of Locke (give each their due), and in the ethical egoi m of
Hobbes (the advantage of the stronger).
According to Gallie's theory, none ofthese views ofjustice will be deemed universal!
true by virtue of rational argument. While we can agree that certain acts are just and others
unjust, it is unlikely that we will be able to produce a universal definition. This is so, Gallie
claims, because (a) we think of justice as "good" and injustice as "bad" (appraisive), (b)
instantiations of justice depend upon factors like it being "blind," and "swift" (internally
complex), (c) one formulation might sacrifice the "blindness" ofjustice for the sake of it being
"swift," where another formulation might rank "blindness" the most important with little or
no consideration for it being "swift" (initially variously describable), (d) in a society where the
application ofjustice is made to take place at an uniform rate, the factor of "swiftness" is no
longer considered, but the contest is not affected; likewise the contest may expand to include
arguments over the inclusion and importance of the "equal di stribution" ofjustice (open), and
(e) the proponents of the different views ofjustice understand their opponents' arguments,
yet still maintain that theirs in the only true or defensible understanding ofjustice. That is,
one view might propose that 'while swiftness is important, blindness is the most important
consideration, and without that priority, it is not realiy justace at all' (used aggressively and
defensively) .
In addition to the five conditions for essential contestability, Gallie also recommended
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two clauses to make sure that the contest is an essential cont-est and not just a dispute ov r
a "radically confused" concept. Both of the conditions concern the notion of an exemplar.
or paradigmatic "type-specimen." Gallie states that the concept in question must b a
derivation from the work of an exemplar, or conceptual figure-head. like a Darwin or
Newton, and that all participants acknowledge the exemplar as being authoritative. Given the
authority ofthe exemplar, the contesting schools must be involved in advancing the ideals of
the exemplar.
If there was an essential contest in taxonomy, there is certainly evidence that the
exemplar exists and is highly regarded. The issue at hand, however. is not who is advancing
the ideals ofthe exemplar, but what those ideals actually are. If the contest over "Darwinian"
is an essential contest, it must necessarily be prior to any other essential contests in taxonomy
(if there be any), since the authority of the exemplar is otherwise undecided 39
We might now ask whether the notion of "Darwinian" is in fact an essentially
contested concept. According to Gallie's conditions. the concept must be (a) apprai ive. In
the case of"Darwinian" this is certainly the case. The authority to establish the foundation
of taxonomy ostensibly belongs to whomever has this title. Whether in terms of posterity.
vanity, career achievement, or self-fulfillment, the responsibility and honor associated with
this label is necessarily "a good thing." The concept must also be (b) internally complex. As
we have seen, the Ctadists appeal more to the "intent" or "spirit" of Darwinism, where the
Evolutionary taxonomists support the literal theory as the primary element. Neither the
Cladists nor the Evolutionary taxonomists hold that intent and literal interpretation are
unimportant, they are just not equally important. Lesser factors, such as social groups,
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almost certainly have a role which can be variously assessed, but the basic difference in
fundamental principles outlined in the previous chapters show tbat there are multiple
components involved in the concept of "Darwinian." Furthermore since each school places
different importance on different components, the concept can be said to b (c) initiall
variously describable.
To show that "Darwinian" is an (d) open concept, we need only reflect on what Hull
said of the struggle for scientific success: "... the proper response to imminent refutation is
not admitting defeat; it is changing one's position while retaining one's original terminology."
Scientific dominance is often a matter of conceptual modification without a change in
resolution. With the concept of "Darwinian," this is probably the rule rather than the
exception. Ifthe bestowal of the title is based on the perceptions of the immediate scientific
community, then political tactics, such as manipulating one's position to sound the most
"Darwinian" to a particular audience, would be commonplace. If one also manipulates the
notion of "Darwinian" to match one's taxonomic position, as perhaps Mayr and the
Evolutionary taxonomists do, then it seems clear that there are no necessary limitations on
how the concept may be applied.
Finally, Gallie insists that an essentially contested concept is (e) used aggressively and
defensively. This condition requires that contestants must be able to understand and
appreciate their opponents' positions, perhaps even share parts of them, while simultaneously
claiming that their opponents have it all wrong. What makes this condition so interesting is
that in claiming that the other contestants have it wrong, there is no contradiction, only a
preference. In the Science letters, Padian clearly displays this preference. In asserting that
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Mayr is a "Linnaean essentialist,' Padian is expressing his preference for "Darwinian
classification over "Linnaean," while also implying that' Linnaean essentialism is wrong
because it is not "Darwinian." Mayr, on the other hand, refutes Padian's claim by suggesting
that it is inconsistent with the history of taxonomy, asserting that Padian has it wrong. E en
without the rhetoric ofthe Science letters, it can be seen how the Cladistic and Evolutionary
schools share many fundamental principles, yet on a few key points, they are aggressivel (and
defensively) divided.
If the conditions of essential contestability are sufficiently met, then Gallie' s theory
states that no rational argument can determine which definition, or which application of
"Darwinian" is correct. That is, if anyone is determined to be a consensus "Darwinian," it
will not be by virtue ofa rational argument; some other means of persuasion must have been
employed. If "Darwinian" is an essentially contested concept, then what does this tell us
about our views of science and about similar types of problems in taxonomy, such as with
Cotylorhyllchus?
One of the conunon assumptions made about essentially contested concepts is that the
use ofsuch concepts somehow shrouds or denies access to the true meaning. Some defenders
of the essential contestability thesis have suggested otherwise. In the case of political
concepts, they claim, it is not our access to truth that is blocked, but our access to "political
reality." As Richard Grafstein summarizes,
[p]olitical reality, according to this interpretation, cannot be distorted by the
way we conceptualize it since it is first constituted through conceptualization;
through, that is, the normatively based conceptual and linguistic organi.zation
of experience. ...[A] political concept does not have a separable fund of
factual content, an objective link to an independent world. There is no such
independent political world on which to report 40
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We might conclude from this that essentially contested concepts like "Darwinian" are
necessarily distinct from truly scientific concepts, which rely heavily on an "objective link to
an "independent world." But as Kuhn points out scientific conceptual systems do not alwa
represent the same independent world. It is sometimes the case that different explanations
of what is presumed to be an objective and independent world are populated with
incompatible conceptualizations. In Kuhn's system, two competing conceptual systems are
incommemurable if either contains concepts referring to things in the independent world to
which the other conceptual system does not.
While Kuhn's theory is similar to essential contestability, the claim of
incommensurability is far more pervasive. Incommensurable conceptual systems may have
homophonic concepts without a common referent, and the failure of the two conceptual
systems to corroborate on one conceptual point can destroy the theoretical ties the two
systems share, making accurate communication (including arguments) impossible To some
extent, an out-of-context use of monophyletic is a case of incommensurability. Without the
context of the Cladistic or Evolutionary taxonomy, monophyletic refers to both notions
Without the provided context, a taxonomist reading this work would not be sure whether
Padian's claim that Mayr's grouping did not constitute a monophyletic taxon is pejorative or
just a statement of his [Padian' s] own position.
While some disputes in science may be the result of incommensurable conceptual
systems, it would be an entirely different matter for concepts in scientific discourse to become
essentially contested. The Newtonian and Einsteinian conceptions of "time," as Kuhn
suggests, are incommensurable. The two schools have different concepts expressed by the
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same name. If this were a case of essential contestability the proponents would ha e the
same core concept, but disagree as to what constitutes an ill tanlia/ioll of this concept. In
the case of "time," scientists may argue for the rightful ownership of the concept name
(motivated by the pending success of their respective paradigms), but essential conte ts ar
over the ownership of the truth of an interpretation of a concept.
The important distinction to make between incommensurable and essentially contested
concepts is that incommensurable concepts are brought about by a theoretical
overdetermination of meaning, and an essentially contested concept is brought about by
theoretical underdetennination4 ! of meaning. That is, the meanings of incommensurable
concepts have been made so theory-specific that inter-theoretical use is impossible. The
meaning ofan essentially contested concept lacks theoretical resolution. i.e., it is persistently
vague. Yet, essential contestability goes beyond "ordinary" underdetermination; while
underdetennination can cause serious theoretical difficulties:2 there is the possibility of
resolution by scientific means. That is, empirical tests or arguments may be used to make the
concept more clear and precise. In the case of essential contestability, however. there i no
scientific recourse available: vagueness is inherent in the concept. not in the instantiations of
the concept in the "objective and independent world."
As with "Darwinian," the problems with COlylorhynchlls do not reside in the
"objective and independent world." The difficulty with COlylorhy/U.:hus is its proper
categorization. Questions ofproper categorization, as suggested above. are not resolvable
by arguments based on tests. There is no test to decide which categorization is the hesl
categorization. We might well conclude that arguments over the best categorization of
4\
CotylorhYllchus are not simply cases of"ordinary" underdetermination. It is not at all clear
however, that they are essential contests. That is, it is not clear that saying ory/orh 11 hu
is in the class Syoapsid rather than the class Reptilia is saying something good about it.
If the proper classification for CotylorhYllchus is established by those shrouded with
the "mantle of Darwin," and the title of "Darwinian" is in fact essentially contested then it
stands to reason that arguments over Cotylorhynchus are related in some way to the essential
contest. While there is no appraisive quality that has any obvious ties to the specimen s
categorical status, a resolution of this debate will require a prior resolution of the essential
contest over "Darwinian." That is, before a debate over a classification can be resolved,
someone must be io a position to resolve it by virtue of their "Darwinian" authority. Thus.
the essential contest over "Darwinian" can be considered an efficacious component to
categorical disputes over CotylorhYllchus.
With respect to the Archaeopteryx, resolution of the specimen's place in the history
of life is dependent upon an authoritative position on the status of birds and bird-like reptiles
in the history of life. In order for these subjects to become non-issues. the essential contest
over "Darwinian" with respect to these issues must be ended. Unlike other events in science.
the resolution of an essential contest over "Darwinian" will not be considered a breakthrough.
or a significant advance; rather, those who inherit the mantle of Darwin will do it quietly.
most likely by attrition or suppression. Recall that Gallie's guarantee doesn't state that
essential contests will never be resolved, only that they will not be resolved by ratiollal
argument.
Thus we are left with a (scientifically) precarious explanation of the behavior of
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taxonomists. If the arguments over "Darwinian' can be considered a case of Gallie
"essential contestability," we have far more ofan explanation than either Popper or Kuhn can
provide. Since their philosophies of science can not account for the uses of scientific
authority, an explanation that focuses on the rhetorical nature of the concept is our only
recourse, especially in light of the driving forces behind the applications of scientific authorit .
In illustrating that the assigrunent of "Darwinian" has all of the characteristics of an essential
contest and relating these characteristics to the taxonomy that makes the applications of
"Darwinian" noticeable, we can see that the essential contest is best described as an




In this work, I have tried to examine a hotly contested field of science which se m
to display a dependence on paradigm authority. The dispute over the categorical status of
Cotylorhyllchus is a minor quibble in comparison to some of the debates in taxonom . But
in establishing the cases of Cotylorhynchus and Archaeopteryx, as well as the history behind
Cladistic and Evolutionary taxonomy, we have seen that there is something disputed in
addition to theoretical and methodological principles, namely, the status of being
"Darwinian." The fundamental principles at the center of the disputes between the two
schools seem to coincide with a battle for the authority of the "Darwinian" tradition.
The two main views of science available can give good explanations of many of the
important events in the history of science. Yet neither view seems to be able to account for
instances when "scientific authority" is the basis for making important judgements on
methods, evidence, or principles. The notion of "authority" over science and scientists
becomes very important if the resolution of "rear' scientific issues (under Popperian
standards) depends on the decisions made by those with the authority, who are in our case
the "Darwinians." Yet these judgements seem to be moved most Iy by rhetoric and soci al and
political impulses within the scientific community, not by tests, rational arguments, or
evidence.
Given that social and political impulses are a driving force in at least some of the
history of science, J suggest that Gallie's theory of essentially contested concepts be applied
to the case of the "Darwinians." Gallie's thesis states that certain types of appraisive and
complex concepts are "essentially contested," and that no rational argument should be
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expected to resolve issues that directly involve these concepts. The concept of"Darwinian, ,
as it has been expressed, seems to meet Gallie's criteria. According to Gallie's theory,
"Darwinian" is an essentially contested concept. While the direct influence of the essential
contestability of"Darwinian" on the arguments between Cladistic and Evolutionary taxonorn
may not be obvious, the connection is fairly clear when considering the assignment of
categorical status to specimens like Coty[orhyllchus and Archaeopteryx. The classification
systems in dispute are largely metaphysical in nature, thus the disputes are not easily resolved
by "standard" scientific methods. Thus, we are led to wonder how these disputes could be
resolved.
It is my claim that the essentially contested nature of"Darwinian," that is, the struggle
for the authority of the "Darwinian" tradition, is one of the major, if not dominant factors in
these disputes. In other words, there is no way to arrive at a "scientific" resolution of
arguments like those over Cotylorhynchus. They are essentially arguments over who has the
right to wear the mantle ofDarwin. Seeing that these arguments are mostly rhetorical gives
a better understanding of how they can often become bitter, personal, and the source of great
rivalries. Furthermore, by adding the explanatory framework of essential contestability to our
existing views on science, we are able to explore other problematic and normative issues in
science with a level ofobjectivity consistent with the Popperian and Kuhnian systems, and we
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